Speech by the Bishop of Manchester on religious hatred during a Lords debate (29th November 2004)

Today, I wish to address the proposal relating to incitement to religious hatred. That is a matter of particular concern in the Manchester diocese, where we have a large and complex ethnic mix, and where the other faith and community leaders have invited me to be their permanent convenor. In our meetings during the past two years, I have been aware of the increasing sense of insecurity felt by all faith communities, not least by the many Jews in Prestwich, where I live.

Protection against incitement to hatred is already offered to Jews and Sikhs. The Minister will be aware that, in its evidence to the Select Committee, of which my friend the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Portsmouth was a member, the Board of Deputies of British Jews expressed doubts about the value and effectiveness of a new law, on the grounds that it was likely to be no more effective than the existing laws on racial incitement-a rather damning comment-and that it might give schismatic groups a weapon with which to attack each other. The Jewish concern, clearly, is not that the law is inadequate, but that existing laws are not enforced adequately.

Nevertheless, the Board of Deputies recognised, as does the Church of England, that there is-as the noble Lord, Lord Dholakia, said-an imbalance in relation to Muslims and other faith groups, and therefore a need to support other faith communities in seeking a new law. Equality before the law is important, and all those who experience harassment and threats because of their religion, or lack of it, are entitled to protection. However, it is essential that any new offence should be framed in such a way as to permit rational discussion and criticism of religion, even in sharp terms, and the pursuit of people's religious beliefs, including the activity of proselytising, as long as this does not cause harm to others.

What of the categories of persons against whom religious hatred can be cited? It appears from measures such as the employment equality regulations and the Draft Charities Bill that the Government's approach is not to seek to define what amounts to "religion" or "religious belief", whether by listing particular religions or by reference to a general definition. Such a broad and flexible interpretation of "religion" does not seem to me to be problematic in principle. Nor would extension of protection to those who hold no "religious belief" be problematic, though of course there would be implications for the Churches if new offences could come into play in the activity of evangelising those of no faith.

That brings me to the nature of the conduct required: the ingredients of an offence that might lead those engaged in evangelising to be at risk of prosecution. Pertinent is the decision in Hammond v Director of Public Prosecutions this year. The administrative court upheld the conviction by magistrates of a "street preacher" under Section 5 of the Public Order Act for displaying, in a town centre, a sign bearing the words "Stop Immorality. Stop Homosexuality. Stop Lesbianism. Jesus is Lord." Several people gave evidence that they were insulted or distressed by the sign. The decision to uphold the conviction appears to show that the border between that which is merely, offensive and that which is "insulting" may be easier to cross than had been thought, especially when the proclamation of what at least some Christians would see as Gospel values conflicts sharply with the values of others. Whether the Hammond judgment conformed to the requirements of the Human Rights Act is a matter on which I am not qualified to venture an opinion.

I turn now to the nature of the intention required to commit an offence. At the time of previous proposals, Christian groups expressed concerns that the provisions could penalise proper religious debate or evangelistic activity. Indeed, the Select Committee saw real difficulties in framing new offences of the kind proposed, given the rights of freedom of religion and expression protected under the Human Rights Act. I refer to chapters 6 and 7 of the select committee report.

In the Norwood case in 2002, the divisional court upheld a conviction under Section 5 of the Public Order Act. A poster in a window, saying "Islam out of Britain" was found to be an attack on Muslims, and placing it in a window deemed likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress. In the Hammond case, to which I have earlier referred, that person's behaviour was found likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress simply by reference to the fact that the same activity had given rise to distress previously. In the light of those issues, the Government's intention to include a requirement for the consent of the Attorney-General to the bringing of any prosecution is welcome, and might indeed ensure that the new offences would be invoked only in cases when it was clearly recognised to be in the public interest.

Provided that the various concerns I have expressed are satisfied, the view from these Benches is one of general welcome and qualified support. The Government are to be congratulated on seeking to rectify the present unequal protection offered to different religions and to deter religiously motivated incitement of harm against people of all faiths and none. I hope and believe that the Government will be sensitive to anxieties about inhibiting free speech and the need to avoid penalising robust argument whether in promotion of or criticism of religious belief and practice.

We know that this country now has many faiths within it. We also know that religion has tragically contributed to human conflicts and division, and still does. But I am very aware from the privilege I have of convening and at times representing the leaders of different faiths in Greater Manchester that each faith, when properly followed, has within it an enormous capacity to enable this country's different communities to live and work together in pursuit of peace and justice. From these Benches, we want to support the Government in providing a constructive legislative contribution to that process.